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February 2011 Archives

Holy crap, do I not agree with this article in the least. The general consensus form the article is that, because we can count the number of actual mobile malware infections on one hand, we should take a lackadaisical attitude towards it because: The phones are typically more "closed," making it more difficult to exploit (cough, bullsh1t, cough), the only way of infiltrating is through an app store (oh sure, every line of code is examined, even through "third party" stores), and Windows is still dominant, versus a plethora of smartphone software and OS versions (I call bull$hit here too - just think about the times you've tried to exploit a box but it was the wrong service pack, language, or point version of an application). Instead, how about chilling out about it, how about we make the industry BETTER around smartphone security before we end up with a sh1tstorm of activity.


Further, this article demonstrates a dangerous misunderstanding of a number of core security concepts, not to mention missing the point of what a security conference is about.

First, with the security concepts. The reason the bad guys have not gotten to the mobile platforms en-mass is because the money is not there . . . yet. Please, do a simple good search on mobile banking apps for iPhone and Android. You will see there is a big push to move towards these platforms. As people move the management of their daily lives more and more from the PC to their phones you will see the crime follow.

This brings me to the next point. The purpose of a security conference is to discuss future trends and to sound the alarm before the boat hits the iceberg.

We need to start to focus on this issue now. First, your data is moving this way. Secondly, there are very few security features built into these devices. Finally, there is little in the way of monitoring and management for these devices in a large-scale environment.

I really do not think I would like to be behind an article that says, "...[I felt] a lot more relaxed about the security of my smartphone...." Really?

Wow. It looks like this panel failed.


vader-fail.jpg

Brought to you by: haxorthematrix and strandjs

Originally discussed during episode 231

Mike and Mike, Murr and Murray... you figure it out, join in to discuss phishing and the way they go about creating phishing emails that get very high response rates. Even one that had 110% acceptance.

Mr. Carlos Perez takes us on a journey of OSX post exploitation.

Then some chuckleheads discuss stories from the week.

Episode 232 Show Notes

Episode 232 Direct Audio Download

All the Pauldotcom Security Weekly episodes on our Bliptv archives.

Hosts: Paul "PaulDotCom" Asadoorian,John Strand,Larry Pesce

Audio Feeds:

I still maintain that attackers will not take down the Internet, for the most part. So, there are types of attackers that want to do damage, so-called "Hacktivism" groups. However, these tend to be more targeted attacks, such as the DoS attacks launched by Anonymous against Paypal and other credit card companies. Most of the attackers are out there making big money on the Internet, and can't afford massive outages. Reports are that there is no public exploit, which I never believe. I just believe we haven't seen one in use.

I relate it to the mafia. If you study mafia history, you know its tough for a bunch of criminals to get along. They try to avoid a full-scale war within their families because "war is bad for business". Of course, they are criminals, and it happens from time to time, but for the most part it is (criminal) business as usual.

kick-assjpg-bae226e72e442c48_large.jpg
What "business as usual" might look like

The other thing we need to keep in mind about this is just how fragile things can be when we work in a monoculture. Granted, there are a number of issues that arise when we move away from monocultures, but we need to balance the pros and cons of both. For example, take a look at the system you are on right now. There is a wide variety of software that is installed which is consistently installed on almost all systems. Flash, Java, Adobe Acrobat, Firefox are just a few examples of software that is ubiquitous on almost all systems. But it does not stop there. Now, look at the protocols that everything supports. As we have seen in the past, even simple protocols that we all follow, like DNS, can have design issues in the way the RFCs are implemented that can lead developers down a bad path.

LittleKidBigHill (1).jpg
This will end well

So, what to do? To be quite honest, you need to look at the path data takes to and from the heart of your environment. For example, Internet > Edge Router > Firewall > IDS > Web Server > Database. If you look at this chain there is a particular vendor or product that produces all the products leading up to your Web Server. You may want to think through how you would deal with a vulnerability that impacts all of those products that make up your security support structure.

-PaulDotCom and strandjs

Originally on episode 232.

Please join us for PaulDotCom Episode 232, where Mike Murr and Mike Murray promise a lively delivery of "The top 5 most overlooked keys to phishing success".

You can view the live feed tomorrow night by watching the below video:

NOTE: The video will play the most recent show up until we are live!

Each episode comes complete with show notes, detailing the interviews, tech segments, and stories presented. Please visit our Episode 232 Show Notes Page on the Wiki for more info on the podcast.

For interactive live video, audio, and chat during each episode you can visit PaulDotCom Live!, just hang out in our IRC channel, or tune into PaulDotCom Radio for an audio only version of the show.

Make sure to click those links, and enjoy the show live!

- Paul Asadoorian, Larry Pesce, Carlos Perez, Darren Wigley, John Strand and Mike Perez.

So many things wrong with that title. First off I think it should be 8 ways, but make #1 "Don't be douchebags."

300-jersey-shore-guys.jpg
Note to Mr: Evans
Having your own show does not make you "cool"

Okay, so here's the list:

1. Don't assume what type of attack will manifest - That's some solid advice. You should prepare, within all acceptable reasons for your highest risk scenarios. We find that a lot of the people making "risk-based decisions" are the same people that believe they will be attacked by hackers like Angelina Jolie.


hackers_JOLIE 1995.jpg

What Larry wishes all "Hackers" looked like

Rather, think of how normal, everyday people access data on your network. Why? Because that is most likely the path the bad guys will take.

2. Use tried and tested CMS - Sounds okay, but think about some of those alleged CMS‚ Joomla, Wordpress, etc. Not much better, but the argument against a custom system does have some merits. All CMS sucks. But that being said, there is something to being said for getting hacked and not paying six figures for the right because you paid for a custom piece of software. I may suck at math, but paying $150k+ and paying for a compromise is worse than just paying for the compromise.

3. Use strong password hashing - Fair, but even well-hashed passwords can be bruteforced with enough time and computing power. We've talked about passwords often enough that you know they are broken. Trust us, there is a huge difference between hashing/crypto like Lanman with a static key (hello KGS!@#$%) and crytp3 using sha256. If you do not know the difference, here is a hint - Rainbow Tables.

4. Use strong passwords - Ditto. Sure, but how about something better? Maybe we could look at passphrases? Look, I know this is going to be a shock to a lot of guys out there, but length matters. Most anything over 15 characters is going to take a long time to crack.

5. Don't reuse passwords - Very good advice, but mere mortals may have issues. Back to the password issue again.

6. Keep patches current - Yes, for known exploits, you should be doing this stuff, especially if it doesn't break functionality. Don't be slow about it either. I'd say to do restrictive firewalls and such, but the cases in point here wee privilege escalation, which means they are already on the box‚

7. User awareness of social engineering - Yes, yes 1000 time – yes! Even then it still won't sink in, you still should try. Yes, even "smart" security folks can fall for it, and get someone to open ports on your firewall. Just because it is a "dumb idea" does not mean you should not do it. The reason why user awareness sucks so bad, is because the training is awful. You really should look to working with some people who know how to do it and do it right.

Flint_Inlike_promo_girls.jpg
Notice how they have his complete attention..
Best user-awareness training ever!

Brought to you by: haxorthematrix and strandjs

Originally discussed during episode 231

Surbo and hevensnt join us from the land of Kansas to give us the scoop on hacking Evite. Also why they think that hackers are a bit out of shape and what they are doing about it. It involves running... nothing chasing you just running for... get this... FUN!!

Then we discuss some stories for the week with a Cheap Trick lead in.

Episode 231 Show Notes

Episode 231 part 2 Direct Audio Download

All the Pauldotcom Security Weekly episodes on our Bliptv archives.

Hosts: Paul "PaulDotCom" Asadoorian,John Strand,Larry Pesce

Audio Feeds:

Hot off the heals of yesterday’s post!!!

I'm not trying to use buzzwords or get popular by using the term "0day threat" (in fact I hate the whole way we say "O-Day", it’s just annoying). In any case, there is an "O-Day" floating around for Microsoft systems, in particular the SMB service on Windows 2003 AD servers. Ouch. So you're probably saying, "But I have a firewall, IDS/IPS, Anti-Virus software, and patch management." So do a lot of people, which is why attackers use social engineering and "O-Day" attacks. You have to ask yourself, if someone wanted to target you, how successful could they be? What's stopping them from getting your users to click on a link or open an attachment? What stops your users from accessing SMB on your servers? How do your servers defend against a 0day attack? This is one reason why I love real-world hacking challenges. I've done several over the years, and it always starts out the same way. You have to defend the network for the first hour of the competition without a firewall and without patches. "But that’s not fair," people say, but that’s the real world. It’s like that scene from the movie "Dodgeball" where the coach has them all line up for training. He then takes out a giant wrench, and without warning, hurls it at one of the guys who gets clocked in the face. He then states, "If you can dodge a wrench, you can dodge a ball." So, if you can defend a "naked" network, you can certainly defend one with a firewall and other techniques. It’s not so much about protecting the attack to begin with, but what happens afterwards.

Further, if we look at defending without a firewall, without AV and missing patches it just so happens that your are getting frightfully close to the way the "real-world" is. AV can be easily bypassed. IDS is routinely sidestepped by simply using encryption or by the attackers using protocols you use to manage your network (SSL, SSH, RDP anyone?). So, with that in mind, how well can you defend your network?

knife-gun-fight.jpg
Gun wins every time

Finally, sit down and think for a moment... How much would an attacker gain by obtaining access to your critical data? If the attacker can gain, say, a million credit card and they can get $1 on the black market for it, there is a significant up side for them to do this. If an attacker can gain one million by compromising your network, do you think there is a possibility they may go through the effort to develop or purchase 0day?

No friends, it has nothing to do with prevention anymore. It is now a questions of containment and detection.

-PaulDotCom and strandjs

Originally on episode 231.

Another great guest post from Dennis Antunes:
In Part 1 of this series, I barely scratched the surface of password brute forcing.

In this post I hope to go beyond the basics and demonstrate some approaches I use to significantly increase the quality of my tests as well as my chances of success.

Success?
Everyone measures success differently, but hopefully some of you will consider success using these techniques to convey the importance to your developers, customers, bosses, friends, spouses, etc. of selecting strong passwords for web-based authentication mechanisms. I am not talking simply about complexity, length, and so forth, although they of course help. Rather, I am referring to the quality of the password, something that is more difficult, but not impossible to enforce.

An example: Your password policy states you must use 3 out of the 4 of the following: upper, lower, numeric or special, and it must be at least 8 characters.
Password33 meets this requirement as does MhaLlwfl3z, but one is much more secure. How much, not sure, but practically speaking way more. I know in a pen test I will try Password33 against any and all your user accounts every time (and so would a script kiddie). The second one though? 9 seemingly unrelated characters? Doubtful.

Now, the second password is a take on a commonly known phrase (free gift to the first correct guesser). Extremely easy for me to remember, but hard for you to guess. Can it be guessed in an all-out brute force? Definitely, but hopefully I have other compensating controls in place: account lockout, IPS, admins with a clue, etc.

Its in the Dictionary, Stupid.
My point is, if you MUST rely upon only user name and password, you need to ensure your users are choosing passwords that are not easily guessable. Far better to use a non-dictionary word or a pass phrase. For example, I personally like to use song lyrics of my favorite artists, like this one: IlUoUlm33

Give up? Yes its Barney, a take on the epic "I love you, you love me" opus. See it now? Unforgettable, complex, simple and disturbing all at the same time.

Generating (supposedly) Complex Passwords For Cracking
Now starting with a decent password list, like RockYou's worst 500 (RY500 from here on out) mentioned in Part 1, I like to do a few things:
  1. Run CeWL and concatenate w/ RY500
  2. Mangle the expanded RY500 w/ JTR
  3. Run a custom script based on the site's complexity rules for efficiency's sake.
Running CeWL
What cool is: CeWL is a ruby app which spiders a given url to a specified depth, optionally following external links, and returns a list of words which can then be used for password crackers such as John the Ripper. Taken from http://www.digininja.org/projects/cewl.php.

That pretty much sums it up. Basically creates a nice list of words after crawling the site of your target. You can download it here. Be sure to read through the dependencies, documentation and usage examples as there a a couple gotchas.

./cewl.rb <target_domain> -w <outfile>

cat <outfile> RY500 > RY500_expanded

Mangling w/ JTR 
Next we need to mangle our expanded list with JTR. The default mangling rules included with john are nice, but Matt Weir has done great job of expanding on these, which is helpful, consider john's rule writing syntax at first can seem a bit arcane. Download his john_manglingrules.conf, backup your own john.conf and replace it with Matt's improved version.

I suggest you carefully read through Matt's file, do some experimentation with some short password lists and tweak as necessary. For example, his file appends 4 numerics to each password. This can result in a huge number of passwords, which may or may not be desired. You can edit his file before mangling or you can always do some post-processing or trimming later as needed.

john --rules --wordlist=RY500_expanded --stdout > RY500_mangled
Matching complexity
Next, we'll then use a small python script to grep through the results with a gnarly regex to generate a nice list of "complex" passwords according to our configuration. Grab my script here. It really just conceptual. You'll need to tweak it to match the password complexity rules of your site to elimate wasted login attempts.
Running:

./password_complexity_matcher.py RY500_mangled
...will generate a file called complexity_matches.

The Census made me do it
Circling back, you say, "Even though my passwords are lame, you still don't have my user accounts." To which I reply, "Uh, yes I (probably) do."

That brings me to another important point. User names should also have complexity rules and ideally not be based entirely upon the user's actual name.

You see, most companies like to use some variation of your actual name: first initial/last, first name/last, last name/first initial, etc.

If this is your company, and it is of any significant size, thanks to the US Census, I most likely have a significant portion of your user names too.

Taking the lists from the census, and using just the top 100 male and female names interleaved, combined with the top 100 last names results in a boat load of common names, 10K to be exact. Names like...
JAMES SMITH
MARY SMITH
JOHN SMITH
PATRICIA SMITH
ROBERT SMITH
LINDA SMITH
.......
JAMES JOHNSON
MARY JOHNSON
JOHN JOHNSON
PATRICIA JOHNSON
ROBERT JOHNSON
LINDA JOHNSON

...start to emerge

Once you have a nice list of very common names, you can again turn to custom python scripts to generate a variety of formats, add email addresses, etc. to your user names very simply. Better of course if you already know the format, which is probable in a gray box test or if there is a self-registration function. Combine these names with the complex password list we generated with JTR and I am sure you can appreciate the potential.

Fire up Burp, Hydra, or your own custom scripts and have a party.

In Summary
  • Use these techniques to convince your bosses/developers/friends how lame standard complexity rules can be
  • Urge them to use passphrases as they are far stronger and much more fun
  • Consider using obscure usernames, not entirely built on the user's actual name
  • The US Census is your friend
  • If you find this blog entry helpful, kindly buy myself, Robin Wood, and Matt Weir a beer.
Mentoring the SANS Sec 542 in Foxboro, MA beginning 4/13/2011.
Before you register email me at stratmofo at gmail dot com for a special discount code!

Okay, so let me first start by saying that this is a step in the right direction. I firmly believe that embedded system manufacturers who are looking for improved security and forming partnerships with security companies is a good thing. However, and this is a BIG however, look at the track record. I wouldn't be doing this justice if I didn't mention the freakin' huge gaping security hole that HD Moore found in just about all VxWorks devices because they left debug functionality turned on! I'm sorry, but there are just some things that cannot be helped by security companies, and that’s poor security practice. Oh, and furthermore, so many embedded systems vendors give you a backdoor in your firmware, which gives administrative control, where I can turn off any extra layers of protection. And don't get me started on Mcafee, "Oh look, /proc is a virus, I will just delete it!" Great, thanks for that. Security is not about add-ons and features, it’s about processes and controls. Wind River came out and said, "But our operating system is secure" yet it wasn't, not even close. Security is culture, not products, and I sincerely hope embedded device manufacturers adopt a more security-focused culture.

my-little-pony-leia (1).jpeg
Paul also wants a pony
Your Princess Leia memories will never be the same

To make matters worse, we constantly run into issues where companies have very poor patching polices for these devices. The reason? It’s an "embedded device," not a "computer." Look, we can point the finger at a number of different vendors, and there is plenty of blame to go around. However, we feel there are limits to that blame. Sure, debug by default is dumb. Sure, having simple buffer overflows in your product is laughable. But, we as security professionals should assume these types of vulnerabilities exist. Once we accept this simple fact, you can architect your environment so that if these eventual vulnerable applications/systems/devices/people are exploited or exploitable you can quickly react and contain the incident.

-PaulDotCom and strandjs

Originally on episode 231.

Back in the Asadoorian residential studio for Episode 231. Joining us on another fabulous February Thursday night in Rhode Island, Stefan Esser stays up really late in Germany to discuss with us ASLR on iPhone and PHP Security or the lack there of.


Episode 231 Show Notes

Episode 231 part 1 Direct Audio Download

All the Pauldotcom Security Weekly episodes on our Bliptv archives.

Hosts: Paul "PaulDotCom" Asadoorian,John Strand,Larry Pesce

Audio Feeds:

I LOVE vulnerabilities like this! You win remote code execution over port 443, where you then win a free trip to the configuration of end-user policies, and as a bonus you will get an exclusive excursion to "perform other administrative tasks." Consider that this is software that touches every end-user workstation, and it’s a vacation I can wait to go on. The best part is that most people are giving this vacation away because, well, it’s on the inside of the network so I don't have to patch it. That’s when BEEF comes in handy to hook your browser, read your bookmarks and URL history, find the internal IP/Hostname of your CSA console, then hopefully get your browser to send the payload I need. At least that’s how I see it going down, and I will have a fancy drink with lots of umbrellas and fruit in it, just because that’s how I roll on vacation.

WierdAl-WhiteandNerdy-.jpg
Paul On Vacation. They Hatin'


Further, many of the CSA Consoles we have encountered over the past few years have not been patched well at all. While we love the idea of white-listing, this shows some of the limitations of security monocultures. The idea is great, yet the execution can be flawed.

Further, I feel that many of these products tend to make us lazy. Much in the same way AV, Firewalls and IDS have made us lazy. Even though something like CSA or another application white-and-nerdy listing comes out we always need to assume there is going to be vulnerabilities in the product.

Now... We need to find a way to pull Paul off the ceiling and reduce his coffee vrs. cold medicine intake.

Coffee_Stupid.jpg

-PaulDotCom and strandjs

Originally on episode 231.

So this reminded me of a story. I was teaching a firewall class to a small group of people that were internal administrators working for the same organization I was at the time. I was DEEP into statefull inspection, TCP handshakes, UDP, ICMP (yes, we all had our TCP big boy pants on). The course just happened to cover Netscreen firewalls, which is what we used at the time. It was great fun. Oh right, quantum computing. So we're about three quarters of the way through the class, and I'm jumping up and down with excitement about dynamic source port allocation or something, and someone raises their hand and asks me this: "So, with the advent of quantum computing, we aren't going to need firewalls anymore, right?" The question really caught me off guard, honesty. Remember, encryption is only good if you are using it, and using it correctly. Just ask those people who have had laptop stolen or all their email published as a Torrent file on the "interwebs." It begs an interesting philosophical question though: If we can come up with a way for people to authenticate themselves to every service on the Internet, why do we need firewalls? (Sorry my cold medicine has me all "philosophical today").

Phil_Paul.jpg
What Paul Drunk on "cold medicine" might look like

Further, this shows just how far data storage can go. We can store data at the Photon level. This is what we at PaulDotCom call "serious science." The article is deep with techno jargon and seems to be beyond the grasp of us mortals. For example, take the following line:

However, Wang found that if one of the cavities was gently probed before looking inside, thus changing the quantum state, the effect of the probing could be seen, even if that cavity was subsequently found to be empty.

porn_star_scientist_postcard.jpg
Heres to you Mister Porn Star Scientist!


Umm? What? Has this guy been on PaulDotCom? This sounds almost exactly like the topics we cover every show... "Wang could gently probe the cavity before looking inside?" Now they are just messing with us.

I think?

-PaulDotCom and strandjs

In many enterprise environments business needs for performance often trump security (Ok, more often then not). A good example of this is Exchange Administrators getting grumpy about your AV client causing too much of a performance impact on the back-end servers. Depending on the political weight and structure of your position/group, this argument usually ends in one of two ways. Either AV gets put on the box and the Exchange Admins live with the performance hit, or you live without AV on the Exchange server.

Antivirus products can also cause havoc with some products if they detect something and try to remove it. Sure, that string of text may have been similar to a virus from 1997, but the fact that your AV client decided to delete the database in which it was written, well that's a problem.

Luckily, there is a middle ground.

Most enterprise level antivirus solutions allow you to implement specific policies for groups of computers. The problem exists with knowing how and what to implement as well as when to realize that it can't solve your problem. Most software vendors provide (or will provide when asked) a list of specific files/folders to exclude that may have undesired effects on their product. An example using Exchange is provided below.

Microsoft Exchange:
Exclude the following directories:


  • %Program Files%\Exchsrvr\MDBData*.*

  • %Program Files%\Exchsrvr\Mtadata*.*

  • %Program Files%\Exchsrvr\Server_Name.log

  • %Program Files%\Exchsrvr\Mailroot*.*

  • %Program Files%\Exchsrvr\Srsdata*.*

  • %System Root%\System32\Inetsrv*.*

  • %Program Files%\Exchsrvr\IMCData*.*

If your AV software has a web application component, it also may be a good idea to disable monitoring on the ports that Exchange uses, especially HTTP, POP3, IMAP, and all the various secure forms of those protocols.

For more information, see the Microsoft documentation here: File-Level Antivirus Scanning on Exchange 2010 and Overview of Exchange Server 2003 and antivirus software.

Some additional rules for various server types are below.

Backup Servers:


  • Exclude the install directory of the backup software

  • Exclude any Backup to Disk locations if they are local to a client

  • Disable On-Access scanning during backups (or disable scan on file read/open; only scan on write/execution)


Database Servers:

  • Install directory for database (Ex: C:\Program Files\Oracle)

  • Database files themselves (Ex: .DB files)

  • If accessed remotely, disable scanning on the port(s) that the database is accessed from


Terminal/Citrix Servers:

  • Disable GUI loading (so each logged in user doesn't start a new process that isn't needed)

  • Disable all interaction with the client (have it default to strict cleaning, no popups etc.¬†Chances are the user won't have rights/knowledge on how to deal with it anyway, and it could hang the client if it's waiting on a user to take action on a file.


Basically you want to exclude directories, files (or file extensions), and ports that get modified a lot. This will bog down the AV client's scanning and bring the system to a crawl. You'll have to look at each OS and specific applications that are running on your network (this is a good chance for some software inventory and control - no web browsing or email checking on servers), as well as the limitations and features of your specific AV client.

Keep in mind that this approach will not solve all problems and can create it's own. When creating policies keep in mind that you can't (and shouldn't) create unique policies for every host on your network, this will become quickly impossible to manage. There also is a place of diminishing returns when configuring an AV client. If you're excluding more than you are scanning for performance concerns, it might be a good idea to forget the AV and focus on network segmentation and continuous monitoring of the host.

Of corse you want to thoroughly test any implementation before taking it live.

Putting together a set of comprehensive AV policies for your organization can be an excellent step towards better network security, just don't forget the idea of a layered defense; antivirus can't solve everything!

Seth Matheson @ Port 22 Tech

If you are in the DC Metro-area and are interested in learning the theory and language of computer security, I'll be mentoring a SANS 401 GSEC: SANS Security Essentials class in June '11. Contact me or register through the SANS website.

We all knew this.. Who authorized this study? Was there money for it? I have a research project.. Users don't patch their client-side software. Please contact me if you wish to fund this project.

But in all seriousness, there is something to learn from this.... It is that your users reuse the same passwords. The same crappy password they use on your site is the same crappy password they are using on all of the various Goat Sex sites.

Because of this, we need to start looking at alternative authentication mechanisms. Maybe even looking at two factor authentication.

Just for the record, many "two-factor" authentication mechanisms only authenticate you to the computer or resource you are trying to access. This is important because if an attacker gets access to a users system they will be able to piggy-back on that session, thus bypassing your wonderful, delicious two factor authentication.

So even if you strive for something better... It will most likely still suck.

-strandjs

Our guest of honor will be Stefan Esser (i0n1c) who will be on to discuss his thoughts on Improving the ASLR of Mac OS X Snow Leopard

The fine Kansas City based gentlemen of I-Hacked.com, cordially (meaning with cordials in hand), invite you to attend a discussion of Evite web site security, 5K runs, hardware hacking and the simple beauty of GIDs and EIDs.

You can view the live feed tomorrow night by watching the below video, and Paul may even dump beer into his laptop live on camera:

NOTE: The video will play the most recent show up until we are live!

Ihacked_evite.jpg

Each episode comes complete with show notes, detailing the interviews, tech segments, and stories presented. Please visit our Episode 231 Show Notes Page on the Wiki for more info on the podcast.

For interactive live video, audio, and chat during each episode you can visit PaulDotCom Live!, just hang out in our IRC channel, or tune into PaulDotCom Radio for an audio only version of the show.

Put on your best running shoes, and enjoy the show live!

- Paul Asadoorian, Larry Pesce, Carlos Perez, Darren Wigley, and John Strand.


The following video demonstrates the manual exploitation of blind SQL injection vulnerabilities in DVWA, followed up by a quick crack of the stolen hashes with John the Ripper.

Important note 1: You must set DVWA's security to medium for the function to be exploitable, as the high security level cannot be exploited, IMO.
Important note 2: On the medium security setting, the PHP function mysql_real_escape_string is used to prepend backslashes to the following characters: \x00, \n, \r, \, ', " and \x1a. This means the SQL server will interpret single or double quotes as text (names actually) rather than special characters which encapsulate a string. It is necessary then to enter any text requiring quotes, most likely in a where clause, as their ASCII hex-encoded equivalent. For example:

1 and 1=0 union select table_name, column_name from information_schema.columns where table_name='users' becomes:
Becomes:

1 and 1=0 union select table_name, column_name from information_schema.columns where table_name=0x7573657273

Sorry, but the end of the video gets cut off a bit. Following the exploit, I crack the stolen MD5 hashes w/ JTR with using the command:

john --format=raw-MD5 dvwa_hashes
For best results watch in fullscreen, HD. Enjoy!...



Posted by Dennis Antunes.
If you are in the Boston-area, and would like to learn this and much more in a hands-on situation, I'll be mentoring the SANS 542 Track: Web App Penetration Testing and Ethical Hacking beginning 4/13/2011. Contact me: stratmofo at gmail dot com directly for special discount.

PaulDotCom Hacked!!!

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Well, not really... Yet.

Look, it is just inevitable. At some point PDC is going to get hacked is some fashion or another. We at PDC watched what happened to the fine folks at Offensive Security, HBGary and LIGATT and thought to ourselves, "Damn! Some (not all) of those organizations are way smarter than we are and they got compromised." So we have decided to create the following forum letter before a compromise happens just to cover our bases.

Because, as many of you know, it is not a matter of "if" it is a matter of "when." We just hope that it is not something really dumb, like a default password or a missing OS patch. But, as you all know, stuff happens.

All the intern needs to do is choose the proper options in the [] brackets. We figure this just makes the whole process more streamlined.

####BEGIN LETTER#####

Dear [Sir, Madam or name with numbers AND l3tt3rs!!]


It came to our attention yesterday that your fine hacking [establishment, club, crew, harem and/or cabal] was able to successfully compromise one of the PaulDotCom servers. Well done! Once we sobered up enough to realize the server was compromised we [gave up drinking, hit the "off" button, went to the cigar bar or drank ourselves into oblivion] and left it to the intern to fix the server.

While your kudos as an l33t hax0r organization are well deserved we would like to ask you a simple favor. A small request from the "l@m3rs" you just "p0wn3d". Please, look towards using your skills for the purposes of good and not evil.

You may disagree with our views on [full disclosure, responsible disclosure, no disclosure, mo disclosure, beer, cigars, pen testing, security, being sellouts, not selling out enough, eating meat, an unholy love of wireless access points and/or animal husbandry], however there are some massive issues that the industry as a whole needs to address quickly. I feel, that even though we may disagree on a point or two, we can agree that things are not going in the right direction.

It is the simple objective of PaulDotCom Security Weekly to help people secure their systems. The reason we do this is because we fundamentally believe that if people do not secure their data then someone else is going to step in and do it for them. We do not like the idea of mandated, compliance-based security. We do not like the idea of an Internet where all usage is tracked, and heavily regulated. The only way we know to stop these things from happening is by trying to make people aware of the risks they face and the tools they have to mitigate those risks.

This podcast is our way of giving back and trying to make it better. It is also an excuse to get together, drink beer of varying quality and talk security every week. If you disagree with us on a point or two we extend the offer for you to come on the show and express your point of view. We would also like to request that you tell us what, exactly, it is you disagree with us about... Preferably with color and monosyllabic words. Because in all honesty, we don't what the hell we stand for half the time.

We will hold true to the tradition started by Dan Kaminsky and others and offer you a beer at the next con. After all, small penetration tests can go for more than $10K so it is the least we can do.

Paul promises that he will not cock punch you on sight....

Honest.

Love and kisses,

PaulDotCom Security Weekly

####END LETTER#####

There, that should cover it. Now we simply sit on this and wait.

Sony PS3 Key Tweeted, by Sony

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So, Sony Tweets its own protection key. This key will allow, among other things, people to make copies of games and distribute them online. This could hurt Sony's sales, or would it? I'm thinking that the closed nature of video game consoles hurts sales. If you could buy a device and have it allow for even more functionality, won't they sell more systems? Also, does this really hurt video game sales? Of course, once the key is released and on the Internet, its out there. Restraining orders are a futile effort, why doesn't Sony understand this?

But there is another question that needs to be asked... How the hell did this happen? I mean there are a number of "accidents" that can be explained easily.

"I am sorry, I got your daughter pregnant."

"Dad.. I had no idea it was loaded."

But tweeting the protection key? From a fictional VP's twitter account? That makes no sense.

Either way, I doubt it will make that much difference. IT WAS ALREADY OUT!! So is this news?? Maybe just because it is funny.

- PaulDotCom and strandjs

Linksys WAP610N Vulnerability

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There are some vulnerabilities that I come across which just make my jaw drop. This is one of them. There is a backdoor in the linux-based firmware that allows you telnet to port 1111 and get a command prompt. The command prompt seems to be associated with the console administration program. This console allows you to run shell commands, in addition to several other functions. There is no password required, and it appears that the default password (as shown from dumping /etc/shadow) is wlan. There is no patch for this vulnerability which appears in select firmware versions. "bob" has confirmed that this is real...

This just goes to show that as much as you try to secure something there is a developer who is out to sabotage you. It also gets to the heart of the whole 0 day issue. You have to assume there is a 0 day in your software... Then, plan accordingly

-PaulDotCom and strandjs

Alex Horan from Core Impact, Chris Hoff from Cleveland join a Paul with out his Larry in the cigar lounge to discuss ZeroDay exploit use in testing, The Cloud what it is and how why it matters to you. Chris Hoff shares with us a fantastic story of anatomy showing up on lab computer screens, that really ties the show together. At least Alex's mom thought we did well.

a special thanks to Paul Joyal for letting us take over his cigar lounge for this episode.

Episode 230 Show Notes

Episode 230 Direct Audio Download

All the Pauldotcom Security Weekly episodes on our Bliptv archives.

Hosts: Paul "PaulDotCom" Asadoorian,John Strand,Larry Pesce

Audio Feeds:

Work at Tulane?

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If you work at Tulane there is a very strong chance that your SSN is exposed. Another stolen laptop. Why, exactly do I spend time writing exploits and malware? There are far easier ways to get access to data that can create a lot of damage.

I think it is just a good idea to bring up a breach every once in awhile..

Why?

Because we want to direct your attention to the fine folks at DatalossDB.

This is a site you should visit on a daily basis. This site is the single best source of breach stories to get management to listen.

This whole concept goes nicely with Paul's upcoming webcast...

Wed. Feb 16th at 2PM EST

-strandjs

Andrew Lockhart former superstar of PDC rejoins us for one magical evening. We get a tech segment that gives Larry wood and then there stories in all this wonderfulness. Its is all yours in one download.

a special thanks to Paul's beer fridge... or the contents of said fridge.

Episode 229 Show Notes

Episode 229 Direct Audio Download

All the Pauldotcom Security Weekly episodes on our Bliptv archives.

Hosts: Paul "PaulDotCom" Asadoorian,John Strand,Larry Pesce

Audio Feeds:

Cigars, Scotch, Hoffaccino's and pen testing on deck Thursday night!

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Episode 230 is sure to please Hoffaccino fans and anyone who enjoys more breadth and depth in their pen testing! We'll have Cloud Security guru Chris Hoff and Core Security's Senior Product Manager Alex Horan creating their own special brand of cloud at the PaulDotCom Security Weekly cigar lounge of choice - Joyal's Liquors!

You can view the live feed tomorrow night by watching the below video:

NOTE: The video will play the most recent show up until we are live!

cigars_make_interns_happy.jpg
Darren "will work for scotch, cigars" Wigley

Each episode comes complete with show notes, detailing the interviews, tech segments, and stories presented. Please visit our Episode 230 Show Notes Page on the Wiki for more info on the podcast.

For interactive live video, audio, and chat during each episode you can visit PaulDotCom Live!, just hang out in our IRC channel, or tune into PaulDotCom Radio for an audio only version of the show.

Break out your liquid cheer of choice, and enjoy the show live!

- Paul Asadoorian, Larry Pesce, Carlos Perez, Darren Wigley, and John Strand.

The PaulDotCom crew has survived Shmoopocalypse II and are happy to report that we've come back re-invigorated after partaking in all that is Shmoo.

ShmooCon2011.jpg

ShmooCon 2011: Research, meetups, security, and oh yeah - beer.

We've got former co-host Andrew Lockhart on hand to bring us up to speed on his current work as well as a superb guest technical segment from Foundstone's Brad Antoniewicz on his Proximity Card Systems research.

You can view the live feed tomorrow night by watching the below video:

NOTE: The video will play the most recent show up until we are live!

Each episode comes complete with show notes, detailing the interviews, tech segments, and stories presented. Please visit our Episode 229 Show Notes Page on the Wiki for more info on the podcast.

For interactive live video, audio, and chat during each episode you can visit PaulDotCom Live!, just hang out in our IRC channel, or tune into PaulDotCom Radio for an audio only version of the show.

Break out your liquid cheer of choice, and enjoy the show live!

- Paul Asadoorian, Larry Pesce, Carlos Perez, Darren Wigley, John Strand and Mike Perez.

The Podcast that took two takes cause of memory card failure and you can see how we treat mis behaving memory cards. This episode was recorded at ShmooCon in Washington DC this past weekend. We hope that all of you that were there got a chance to come out and say hi.

memcard.jpg

Thanks to the EFF representative that was trying to go home but gave us a few moments of her time.

Episode 228 Show Notes

Episode 228 Direct Audio Download

All the Pauldotcom Security Weekly episodes on our Bliptv archives.

Hosts: Paul "PaulDotCom" Asadoorian,John Strand,Larry Pesce

Audio Feeds: